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Unsuccessful defendants in Superfund' litigation are generally held
to be jointly and severally liable. Thus, a defendant who has con-
tributed only a small amount of the waste at a Superfund site can be
liable for 100% of the cleanup costs. 2 From the earliest Superfund
decisions, however, courts imposing joint and several liability have
noted that joint and several liability was not required by the statute
and that liability would not be joint and several where common law
principles would apportion the harm among defendants.
3
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1. The Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation
and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §9601 et. seq., is commonly
referred to as the Superfund Law because of the fund created to pay
for the remediation of inactive hazardous waste sites.
2. One commentator summed up a section on joint and several
liability by stating "in a very short period of time, so many courts
had adopted the Chem-Dyne position [holding that Superfund defen-
dants are jointly and severally liable] that there was no longer a rea-
sonable basis for disagreement concerning the application of joint
and several liability." A. Topol and R. Snow, Superfund Law and
Procedure §54.4 at 372 (West 1992), citing United States v. Conser-
vation Chemical, 1984 HWLR 6065 (W.D. Mo. 1984), which cited
five other federal decisions for the proposition that there was no
ground for difference of opinion on the issue. Virtually all of the
Superfund cases cited in this article will use joint and several liabil-
ity as their starting point.
3. See, e.g., United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F.Supp.
802 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (discussed infra notes 13-21); United States v.
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The early cases cited Restatement (Second) of Torts §433A for the
common law rule of apportionment, but did not provide a detailed
analysis of it. They merely concluded that where numerous hazard-
ous substances mixed together to create one mess that needs to be
cleaned up, there is one indivisible harm and liability will not be ap-
portioned.4 These early opinions seemed to overlook the fact that
§433A states that joint and several liability is not imposed where
there is a reasonable basis to distinguish between causes, even if the
causes created one indivisible harm.5 Comment d, for example,
states that "where cattle of two or more owners trespass upon the
plaintiff's land and destroy his crop, the aggregate harm is a lost
,6crop, but it may nevertheless be apportioned... The lost crop is a
single, indivisible harm, but in that case, the Restatement would not
impose joint and several liability. Therefore, Superfund defendants,
trying to avoid the harshness of joint and several liability, are asking
with increasing frequency, "Aren't we like the cows?"
While joint and several liability remains the general rule in Super-
fund cases, four federal appellate courts have used the common law
principles of apportionment set forth in § 433A to permit Superfund
defendants to avoid joint and several liability. 7 Each of these cases
involved an unusual set of facts, and each court was careful to dis-
tinguish its facts from the typical case in which joint and several li-
ability is imposed.8 Each of these decisions provided an analysis of
Monsanto, 858 F.2d 160 (4 th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106
(1989) (discussed infra notes 21-27).
4. See infra notes 13-27 and accompanying text.
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §433A provides as fol-
lows: § 433A. "Apportionment of Harm to Causes
(1) Damages are to be apportioned among two or more
causes where
(a) there are distinct harms, or
(b) there is a reasonable basis for determining the
contribution of each cause to a single harm.
(2) Damages for any other harm cannot be apportioned
among two or more causes."
6. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §433A cmt. d (1965).
7. See infra notes 28-89 and accompanying text.
8. The typical cases have numerous generators of various sub-
stances. In In re Bell Petroleum Servs., 3 F.3d 889 (5 th Cir. 1993),
on the other hand, there was only one hazardous substance at issue
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§ 433A which added significantly to our understanding of when joint
and several liability should be applied. This article will analyze
these recent Superfund decisions that have used § 433A to apportion
liability and explain which Superfund cases are appropriate for ap-
portionment and which are not. In other words, this article will at-
tempt to explain when potentially responsible parties (commonly
referred to as a PRP) at Superfund sites are like the cows.
BACKGROUND
Section 107 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Cleanup and Liability Act ("CERCLA" or the "Superfund Law"),9
provides that four groups of persons "shall be liable" for cleanup
costs: (1) current owners or operators of a facility at which there has
been a release or threatened release of hazardous substances; (2) past
owners or operators who owned or operated the facility at the time of
the disposal of hazardous substances; (3) persons who arranged for
disposal of hazardous substances at these sites; and (4) persons who
transported hazardous substances to the site, if they also selected the
site. Persons in any of these categories are commonly referred to as
potentially responsible parties ("PRPs").
The Superfund Law makes no reference to joint and several liabil-
ity. 10 Indeed, both the House and Senate versions of the bill that
became the Superfund Law contained language authorizing joint and
several liability, but that language was removed shortly before pas-
sage. 11 Nevertheless, reasoning that the removal of the joint and
and each of the PRPs was an owner or operator of the facility at a
different time.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (Jan. 16, 1996).
10. Among the early Superfund decisions that analyze the mean-
ing of the statute's failure to address whether liability is joint and
several are: United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp, 572 F.Supp. at 806;
Colorado v. ASARCO, Inc., 608 F. Supp 1484 (D. Colo. 1985);
United States v. Argent Corp., 21 Env. Cases (BNA) 1356 (D.N.M.
1984).
11. The Senate amendments eliminating joint and several liability
were passed on November 24, 1980. 126 Cong. Rec. S. 14964 (Nov.
24, 1980). The House amendments eliminating joint and several
liability were passed on December 3, 1980. 126 Cong. Rec. H.
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several language from the bill was not a rejection of joint and several
liability, but was merely intended to provide courts with flexibility in
determining whether to apply it, courts have consistently applied
joint and several liability.'
The early Superfund cases were unanimous in imposing joint and
several liability. In the typical case, numerous parties sent hazardous
materials to the same site. The result was viewed as one indivisible
harm and pursuant to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, when two
or more persons cause a "single and indivisible harm," each is liable
for the entire harm.
In United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., for example, more than
600,000 pounds of waste were sent to the site by 289 generators and
transporters. 3 In determining that joint and several liability was
appropriate, the court first analyzed the legislative history of
CERCLA, concluding that the removal of joint and several liability
language did not imply a rejection of joint and several liability. 14
The court stated that joint and several liability was deleted "to avoid
its universal application to inappropriate circumstances."' 5 The court
noted that common law principles should be the source for determin-
ing when to apply joint and several liability, citing Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 433A. 16 The court then cited § 433A for the
proposition that if the "harm is divisible and there is a reasonable
basis for apportionment," then each party will be liable only for a
11787 (Dec. 3, 1980). These amendments are discussed by the
Chem-Dyne court, quoting extensively from Senator Helms' speech.
Senator Helms explained the deletion of joint and several liability as
follows: "Retention of joint and several liability in S. 1480 received
intense and well deserved criticism." Chem-Dyne, 572 F.Supp. at
806.
12. The Chem-Dyne court relied on statements in the legislative
history that indicate congressional intent to rely on common law
principles to determine whether joint and several liability should be
applied. 572 F. Supp. at 806-807 (quoting Senator Randolf "we have
deleted any reference to joint and several liability, relying on com-
mon law principles" and Representative Florio "[i]ssues of joint and
several liability resolved shall be governed by common law").
13. Id. at 811.
14. Id. at 805
15. Id. at 810.
16. Id.
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portion of the harm. 17  The difference between "and" (requiring
both) and "or" (requiring either, as provided in the Restatement)
could have made a difference because the court focused on the na-
ture of the harm, and concluded that joint and several liability was
appropriate because the defendants had "not carried their burden of
demonstrating the divisibility of the harm and the degrees to which
each defendant is responsible." 18 Defendants made a divisibility
argument, but the court concluded that division based on the volume
of waste disposed of would not be an accurate measure because it
did not take into account differences in toxicity or the possibility that
the harm was increased by the interaction between the wastes.'
9
The court's procedural reasoning was also important to the devel-
opment of the law regarding joint and several liability. The court
understood defendant's motion to determine whether liability was
joint and several as a motion for summary judgment.20 On a motion
for summary judgment, the court "construes the evidence in a light
least favorable to the movant.",2 1 This places a heavy burden on de-
fendants and it was therefore easy for the court to decide that defen-
dants did not meet their burden of proof regarding divisibility.
22
17. Chem-Dyne at 811. The court noted that the case "turns on
the issue of whether the harm caused at Chem-Dyne is "divisible" or
"indivisible."
18. Id. at 811
19. Id. The court stated that "the mixing of wastes raise[d] a
question about divisibility of harm." The court also noted that there
was a factual dispute regarding which wastes had contaminated the
groundwater. The court did not see this factual dispute as preventing
summary judgment. The court's decision may be inconsistent with
the Restatement by looking for an accurate basis for apportionment
rather than a reasonable basis. Chem-Dyne, 572 F.Supp. at 811.
20. Id. at 810. The court stated that the defendants request for an
early determination that liability was not joint and several was "es-
sentially a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment." Id.
21. Id. (citing Bohn Aluminum & Brass Corp. v. Storm King
Corp., 303 F.2d 425, 427 (6 th Cir. 1962)).
22. Id. at 811. The court noted the difficult burden a moving
party has, explained that there were factual disputes regarding who
caused what portion of the harm, and therefore concluded that de-
fendants had not met their burden of proof. Id.
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The earliest appellate analysis of the application of § 433A in
Superfund litigation, in United States v. Monsanto, Inc., essentially
followed Chem-Dyne. The court's reasoning made clear that while
citing Restatement § 433A as authoritative, the court had adopted the
Chem-Dyne court's small steps away from Restatement § 433A.
The court affirmed a trial court conclusion that the "harm at Bluff
Road was non-divisible, ' 23 while making clear that the court under-
stood § 433A to focus on the result and not on whether there is a
reasonable basis for apportionment among causes. 24 As will be dis-
cussed later, the examples provided in the Restatement make clear
that whether the result is divisible is not determinative. Indeed, the
whole point of the cows illustration is that a single indivisible result
can be apportioned among defendants.
The trial court also provided a policy reason for the imposition of
joint and several liability - the need to make the government whole
for response costs. 25 This policy is something of a recurring theme
in Superfund litigation (one that becomes less compelling as the
government chooses to sue fewer and fewer of the potentially re-
26sponsible parties). While the court stated that Restatement § 433A
was the basis for the law on the issue of joint and several liability,
nothing in § 433A suggests that making the plaintiff whole is an un-
derlying goal. Indeed, the Restatement suggests that it is not a goal
23. United States v. Monsanto, 858 F.2d 160, 171 (4th Cir. 1988).
The court noted that while large quantities of some substances could
be combined with little impact, small quantities of others could have
disastrous consequences. Thus volume would not be an appropriate
method of division. Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 172
24. Id. at 172 The court stated that to meet burden regarding ap-
portionment, defendants must prove "that the environmental harm at
Bluff Road was divisible." Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 172.
25. Id. at 173. The court stated that making governments whole
was "a primary consideration and that cost allocation was 'more ap-
propriately considered after the plaintiff was made whole."' Id.
26. If the government identifies 50 potentially responsible parties
and chooses to litigate against only the 5 largest, it is difficult to ar-
gue that each defendant should be jointly and severally liable so that
the government recovers all of its costs.
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because apportionment is appropriate even when dividing between
negligent and innocent causes.
27
Recently, four federal courts of appeals have re-examined the issue
of divisibility and § 433A and reached conclusions different from
those reached in Chem-Dyne and Monsanto, albeit in very different
fact patterns: (1) In re Bell Petroleum 28; (2) United States v. Alcan
Aluminum Corp. (3rd Cir. 1992)29; (3) United States v. Alcan Alu-
minum Corp. (2 nd Cir. 1993)30; and United States v. Township of
Brighton.31 Each of these decisions further developed the legal
community's understanding of § 433A and moved away from the
Chem-Dyne/Monsanto presumption that environmental harm is not
divisible.
32
In In re Bell Petroleum, the responsible parties were consecutive
owners and operators of an industrial facility. The contamination
consisted largely of one hazardous substance that had been disposed
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A comment e states
that apportionment should be made between innocent and not inno-
cent causes so that a defendant is not held responsible for harm it did
not cause. For example, where the harm that would result from de-
fendant's dam is exacerbated by an unprecedented and unforeseeable
rainfall, the defendant is not responsible for damage caused by the
unforeseeable rainfall. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A,
cmt. e (1965).
28. 3 F.3d 889 (5 th Cir. 1993).
29. 964 F.2d 252 (3' Cir. 1992).
30. 990 F.2d 711 (2 nd Cir. 1993).
31. 153 F.3d 307 (6th Cir. 1998). See infra note 32 and accompa-
nying text. See also United States v. Hercules, Inc., 247 F.3d 706
(8th Cir. 2001). The Hercules court may be a fifth appellate court
adopting a divisibility analysis, but the court's reasoning is based in
part on Alcan and Brighton Township and does not break new
ground in the area. United States v. Hercules, Inc., 247 F.3d at 716.
32. It is important to note that most trial courts still operate under
a presumption that environmental harm is not divisible. See, e.g.,
United States v. Agway, Inc., 193 F.Supp.2d 545 (N.D. N.Y. 2002)
(describing divisibility as a limited defense to the rule of joint and
several liability) and United States v. Consolidated Coal Co., 184
F.Supp.2d 723, 742 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (stating that liability under §
107 is joint and several).
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of by different parties at different times.33 Two of the parties entered
consent agreements with the EPA, and the remaining party objected
to being held jointly and severally liable for the entire remainder of
the costs.
34
The court began its analysis of joint and several liability by noting
that courts have generally imposed joint and several liability in
CERCLA cases. 35 The court then addressed § 433A of the Restate-
ment. The Restatement states that joint and several liability is not
appropriate either where there are distinct harms, or where "there is a
reasonable basis for determining the contribution of each cause to a
single harm." 36 In a statement that echoes much of the earlier court
decisions on the issue, the court stated that the "nature of the harm is
the key to determining whether apportionment is appropriate." 37
That conclusion seems to focus on the result and whether it is divisi-
ble, while ignoring the explicit statement in the Restatement that
33. See In re Bell Petroleum, 3 F.3d 889, 903 (5 th Cir. 1993). The
facility had three operators. " Leigh owned the real property at the
site from 1967 through 1981, and conducted chrome-plating activi-
ties there in 1971 and 1972. In 1972, Bell purchased the [chrome-
plating business] and leased the property from Leigh. [Bell] contin-
ued to conduct similar, but more extensive, chrome-plating activities
at the site until mid-1976. In August 1976, Sequa purchased the
business assets from Bell, leased the property from Leigh, and con-
ducted similar chrome-plating activities at the site until late 1977."
Id.
34. Id. at 894. A consent decree was approved on July 24, 1990
whereby the EPA "settled its claims against Bell for all costs, past
and future for $1,000,000." In December 1990, another consent de-
cree was approved "pursuant to which the EPA settled its claim
against Leigh for past and future cost - for $100,000." Id.
35. Id. at 895. The court noted that "[a]lthough joint and several
liability is commonly imposed in CERCLA cases, it is not manda-
tory in all such cases." In re Bell, 3 F.3d at 895.
36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1965).
37. In re Bell, 3 F.3d at 896 (stating, "[a]pportionment is inappro-
priate for other kinds of harms, which, 'by their nature, are normally
incapable of any logical, reasonable, or practical division.' Examples
of such are death, a single would, the destruction of a house by fire,
or the sinking of a barge"). In these cases, two or more causes have
combined to cause a single result, incapable of division. Id.
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even if the harm is single and indivisible, apportionment is appropri-
ate where there is "a reasonable basis for determining the contribu-
tion of each. 38
The court then discussed some of the examples of divisible harm
set forth in the Restatement.39 One of those examples addresses
"successive harm," such as when two defendants, inde endent of
each other, pollute the same stream at different times. In such
cases, apportionment is appropriate because it is clear that each party
caused a separate amount of harm and neither party is responsible
for what the other caused.4 1 It is important to note that the reason to
apportion is that it is clear that neither party is responsible for what
the other caused, not that we can establish with certainty what the
other party caused.42 Instead of looking at the polluted stream as one
harm, the Restatement suggests looking at it as two independent
harms: the harm caused by the first polluting party and the separate
harm caused by the second polluting party. This reasoning suggests
that the harm being apportioned is the act causing harm, not the re-
sult.
The court also noted that the Restatement provides for apportion-
ment where a single harm is capable of division upon some reason-
38. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1965).
39. In re Bell, 3 F.3d at 895 (noting that examples of "distinct"
harms are "where two defendants independently shoot the plaintiff at
the same time, one wounding him in the arm and the other wounding
him in the leg. Although some of the elements of damages (such as
lost wages or pain and suffering) may be difficult to apportion, 'it is
still possible to make a rough estimate which will fairly apportion
such subsidiary elements of damages"'). Id.
40. Id. at 895-96, (noting that apportionment is appropriate with
regard to successive harms "because 'it is clear that each has caused
a separate amount of harm, limited in time, and that neither has any
responsibility for the harm caused by the other"'). Id.
41. Id.
42. The standard set by the Restatement is whether there is a rea-
sonable basis for apportionment. In many cases there will be a rea-
sonable basis to apportion, but no certainty with regard to the appor-
tionment. In such cases, the Restatement would apportion. In com-
ment d, for example, it is reasonable to assume similar cows cause a
similar amount of damage, but we are not certain about what each
cow did. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A cmt. d (1965).
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able basis. 43 Two examples of this are: (1) a field trampled by the
cows from two or more neighboring fields and (2) two polluters who
pollute the same stream at the same time.44 Regarding the cows, the
Restatement states that the number of cows owned by each trespass-
ing neighbor provides a reasonable basis for apportionment.4 ' Re-
garding the pollution, the Restatement views quantity of pollution
material as a reasonable basis.46
The court never addressed how successive harms (two polluters
who pollute at different times) differ conceptually from a single
harm capable of division (two polluters at the same time). The in-
jury causing acts are the same. The results (i.e. one polluted stream)
are the same. Whether the injury causing acts occurred at the same
time or at different times seems to be fortuitous. Nevertheless, the
successive nature of the pollution (two polluters releasing the same
substance at different times) made it easier for the court to view its
facts as significantly different from the typical Superfund case, and
permitted the Bell court to rely on the Restatement's examvles of
harms for which there is a reasonable basis for apportionment. 7
At the conclusion of its discussion of the Restatement, the court
noted that whether harm is capable of apportionment is a question of
law, but if harm is capable of apportionment, how to apportion it is a
48question of fact. The court stated, however, that CERCLA cases
present some special difficulties with regard to divisibility because
the Restatement would divide based on the amount of harm each
43. The court may require apportionment to be made where a sin-
gle harm is divisible upon some reasonable and rational basis, fairly
apportioned among the responsible causes, where no injustice to the
parties results. See In re Bell, 3 F.3d at 895.
44. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A, cmt. d (1965).
The Restatement points out that apportionment also is appropriate
where part of the harm is the result of an innocent cause, or where
the plaintiff is responsible for a portion of the harm.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. In re Bell, 3 F.3d at 903.
48. Id. at 896. In many cases, this involves an intensive factual
determination.
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caused, but causation is not necessarily an element of a CERCLA
claim.
49
The court concluded its analysis of the legal background by noting
that CERCLA can lead to unfair results, particularly where a defen-
dant is required to pay huge amounts for damage to which it did not
contribute. 50 The common law tort principles set forth in the Re-
statement "provide sound guidance" to "ameliorate this harshness."
51
After analyzing the case law and concluding that there was uni-
formity of opinion on many key issues, including (1) that CERCLA
does not mandate joint and several liability and (2) the Restatement
is the primary source for determining when to impose joint and sev-
eral liability, the Bell court examined some of the issues about which
there is disagreement. First, the court stated that the issue of joint
and several liability should be dealt with early in the proceedings,
even though some courts had concluded that it was better dealt with
after liability. 52 Second, the court overturned the trial court's conclu-
sion that in order to avoid joint and several liability, a defendant had
to prove with certainty that there was a basis for apportionment.
53
49. Id. at 893 n.4 (noting that "[i]n cases involving multiple
sources of contamination, a plaintiff need not prove a causal link
between costs incurred and an individual generator's waste"). See
also Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1989).
Other courts have likewise concluded that proof of causation is not
required in CERCLA cases. See United States v. Alcan Aluminum
Corp., (Alcan-PAS), 990 F.2d 711, 721 (2d Cir. 1993); see also
United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., (Alcan-Butler), 964 F.2d
252, 266 (3d Cir. 1992); and United States v. Monsanto Co., 858
F.2d 160, 170 (4 th Cir. 1988).
50. CERCLA, as a strict liability statute, will not listen to pleas of
''no fault" and can require parties to pay substantial damages to
which their acts did not contribute. See In re Bell, 3 F.3d at 897.
51. Id. As a result of CERCLA's patent unfairness, "Congress
left it to the courts to fashion some rules that will, in appropriate cir-
cumstances, ameliorate this harshness." Congress pointed to the
common-law principles of tort liability set forth in the Restatement
to provide guidance in doing so. Id.
52. Id. at 901 (stating that "[w]ith respect to the timing of the 'di-
visibility' inquiry, that an early resolution is preferable," leaving the
ultimate discretion in the hands of the district court). Id.
53. In re Bell, 3 F.3d at 903.
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Instead, it concluded that all that was needed was a reasonable ba-
sis.
54
Applying the law to the facts of the case, the Bell court concluded
that the defendant had met its burden of proving that there was a rea-
sonable basis for apportionment as a matter of law.55 The court
stated that the case is analogous to two of the examples given in the
Restatement: (1) cows from two or more fields destroy a plaintiffs
crops and it is reasonable to apportion liability based on the number
of cows each neighbor owns; and (2) liability between two polluters
of a stream can be apportioned based on quantity of pollutants dis-
56charged. The first illustration makes clear that the amount of harm
does not need to be established with certainty - because we do not
know whose cows were active and whose were passive. Indeed, the
court noted that liability could be apportioned even though it is pos-
sible that one party caused all the harm. 57
The dissent takes the majority to task for apportioning liability
when the defendant could not say with certainty which party had
caused what harm.58 Indeed, the defendant was so uncertain that it
presented competing theories regarding divisibility, each of which
54. Id.
55. See In re Bell, 3 F.3d at 904 (holding that,"Sequa met its bur-
den of proving that there is a reasonable basis for apportioning liabil-
ity among defendants on a volumetric basis"). Id.
56. Id. at 903.
57. See id. Citing the cow example, the Restatement suggests that
"apportionment is appropriate even though there is a possibility that
only one of the defendant's cattle caused all of the harm, while the
other defendant's cattle idly stood by." This is justified on the
grounds that it is reasonable to assume that the respective harm done
by each of the defendants is proportionate to their number (cows) or
volume (toxic) produced. Id.
58. See id. at 904 fn. 19. The dissent noted that the trial court had
given the defendant an opportunity for a hearing and at the hearing
the defendant failed to meet its burden of proof by a preponderance
of the evidence. The majority, on the other hand concluded that by
requiring defendant to prove its method of division by a preponder-
ance was requiring certainty, not merely a reasonable basis. In re
Bell, 3 F.3d at 904.
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was based on different assumptions. 59 The dissent saw the court's
acceptance of this basis for apportionment as requiring less than a
preponderance of the evidence. The court, however, stated that the
defendant would still need to prove what it was responsible for by a
preponderance, but the legal issue, decided by the court, was merely
that a reasonable basis existed.60 The court addressed the dissent's
comments, noting that they go to how to apportion, not whether
there is a reasonable basis.
6
The dissent, commenting on the court's response, makes two inter-
esting points. First, that there is both a legal and a factual element to
divisibility. 62 The defendant must show as a matter of law there is a
reasonable basis for apportionment, and then the defendant must
59. See id. at 911. Sequa focused on several potential methods of
achieving a reasonable basis for quantitative apportionment of liabil-
ity on a volumetric basis. Under one method of apportionment, the
Sequa expert pointed to its electrical usage, which was effectively
refuted by other evidence in the case. Another method of appor-
tionment was suggested via Sequa's sales record, which also suf-
fered fatally from an inability to produce an adequate number of in-
voices. Id.
60. Id. at 903.
61. See id. All that is required is that expert testimony and other
evidence "establishes a factual basis for making a reasonable esti-
mate that will fairly apportion liability," unless exceptional circum-
stances exist. "Because each defendant's exact contribution to the
harm cannot be proven with absolute certainty, or the fact that it will
require weighing the evidence and making credibility determina-
tions, are inadequate grounds upon which to impose joint and several
liability." Id.
62. In re Bell, 3 F.3d at 909. The dissent states that the majority
confuses the distinction between the legal burden that the single
harm at issue caused is of a type capable of apportionment, and the
factual burden of proving the amount of harm attributable to a par-
ticular party. Going further, they claim the gist of the majority opin-
ion is based on this legal fallacy: "because the evidence is clear that
Sequa did not cause 100% of the harm to the aquifer, Sequa must be
entitled to a finding by the district court apportioning the amount of
harm attributable to it under the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 433." Id.
20031
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show that said reasonable basis is more likely than not what hap-
pened.63
Second, the dissent challenged the analogy between the Bell case
and the Restatement example of the cows trampling the field.64 In
the dissent's view, this was a case in which there was uncertainty
regarding how many cows each farmer owned as well as uncertainty
regarding how many cows from each farmer were actually in the
65field. Thus, the dissent concluded that any apportionment would
be speculative. 66 The dissent correctly noted that there was a factual
dispute regarding the volumes of waste each party had disposed of.
To the majority, however, that did not mean that as a matter of law
there was no reasonable basis for apportionment, but rather, it meant
that defendant was entitled to a factual hearing to see if it could pro-
vide sufficient evidence to support the basis of apportionment that
the court found to be reasonable.
67
In United States v. Alcan Aluminum (Butler Tunnel), the Third Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals suggested that § 433A of the Restatement
might not only provide a means for a Superfund defendant to avoid
joint and several liability, 68 but might also provide a means for a de-
63. See id.
64. Id. at 910. Stating that in the cow example, "a reasonable,
factual basis for division must exist in order for the court to actually
draw the possible apportionment..." Id.
65. See id. at 911.
66. See id. at 913. The dissent concluded that "Sequa failed to
meet its burden of proof on the factual, quantitative apportionment
issue." In re Bell, 3 F.3d at 913.
67. See id. at 904. The dispute hinges on the meaning of uncer-
tainty. To the dissent, uncertainty regarding whether there is a rea-
sonable basis to apportion means we could not apportion. To the
majority, a reasonable basis is never certain and therefore uncer-
tainty is not inconsistent with apportionment.
68. United States v. Alcan Aluminum (Butler Tunnel), 964 F.2d
252, 271 (3d Cir. 1992) [hereinafter Alcan-Butler] (stating that "[i]f
Alcan can establish that the harm is capable of reasonable appor-
tionment, then it should be held liable only for the response costs
relating to the harm to which it contributed. Further, if Alcan can
establish that the hazardous substances in its emulsion could not
have caused or contributed to the release or the resultant response
[VOL. XIV
JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY
fendant to avoid liability entirely. The case arose out of the cleanup
of a Superfund site in Pennsylvania at which all the defendants ex-
cept for Alcan settled their liability with the government. 69 The gov-
ernment moved for summary judgment against Alcan on the issue of
liability and Alcan cross-moved for summary judgment.70 Alcan
argued that its waste did not constitute a hazardous substance be-
cause the trace amounts of metals in its waste were less than the
background levels for said metals.7'
The court found that CERCLA contains no quantity requirement,
• 72
so one could be liable even for trace elements. The court further
costs, then it should not be liable for any of the response cost") (em-
phasis added). Id.
69. Id. at 257. "In November 1989, the Government filed a com-
plaint against 20 defendants, including Alcan, for the recovery of
costs incurred as a result of the release of hazardous wastes from the
Site into the Susquehanna River. In response, 17 of the 20 defen-
dants executed a consent decree ... on January 17, 1990. On June 8,
1990, two of the three remaining defendants entered into a second
consent decree with the Government... The Government then moved
for summary judgment against Alcan, the only non-settling defen-
dant, to collect the balance of its response costs." Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 256. "During the rolling process, fragments of alumi-
num ingots, which also contained copper, chromium, cadmium, lead
and zinc.. .broke off into the emulsion... According to Alcan, the
level of these compounds in the post-filtered emulsion was far below
the EP toxic or TCLP toxic levels and, indeed, orders of magnitude
below ambient or naturally occurring background levels." Alcan-
Butler, 964 F.2d at 256.
72. Id. at 259-260. The court affirmed a decision that agreed with
the Government, observing that "the plain statutory language fails to
impose any quantitative requirement on the term 'hazardous sub-
stance' and that 'there is no principled basis upon which to deviate
from the ... rule that the mere listing of a substance by EPA renders
that substance hazardous."' The Court in Alcan, ultimately held that
the statute did not, on its face, impose any quantitative requirement
or concentration level on the definition of "hazardous substances."
Rather, the substance under consideration must fall within one of the
designated categories. Id.
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concluded that a plaintiff does not need to prove causation, so Alcan
could be held liable even if its waste did not cause any of the re-
sponse costs. 73 The court then looked to the divisibility of harm is-
sue as a means of avoiding or limiting the unfairness of holding a
party who may not have caused any environmental harm liable for
harm caused primarily by a group of others.
The court began its discussion of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 433A
by noting that the drafters of the Restatement found that joint pollu-
Section 9601 (14) sets forth CERCLA's definition of "hazardous
substance" as:
'hazardous substance' means (A) any substance desig-
nated pursuant to section 1321 (b)(2)(A) of Title 33, (B)
any element, compound, mixture, solution, or substance
designated pursuant to section 9602 of this title, (C) any
hazardous waste having the characteristics identified un-
der or listed pursuant to section 3001 of the Solid Waste
Disposal Act [42 U.S.C.A. 6921] (but not including any
waste the regulation of which under the Solid Waste Dis-
posal Act [42 U.S.C.A. 6901 et seq.] has been suspended
by Act of Congress), (D) any toxic pollutant listed under
section 1317(a) of Title 33, (E) any hazardous air pollut-
ant listed under section 112 of the Clean Air Act [42
U.S.C.A. 7412], and (F) any imminently hazardous
chemical substance or mixture with respect to which the
Administrator has taken action pursuant to section 2606
of Title 15. The term does not include petroleum, includ-
ing crude oil or any fraction thereof which is not other-
wise specifically listed or designated as a hazardous sub-
stance under subparagraphs (A) through (F) of this para-
graph, and the term does not include natural gas, natural
gas liquids, liquefied natural gas, or synthetic gas usable
for fuel (or mixtures of natural gas and such synthetic
gas). CERCLA 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(14).
73. Alcan-Butler, 964 F.2d at 269-270 (concluding that even
though the concentrations of metals in the emulsion were much
lower than naturally occurring background levels and therefore, if
this were the only waste at the site, no one would have considered
cleaning it up, Alcan could, nevertheless be held liable for the
cleanup that was caused by the other waste at the site.)
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tion of water is typically divisible. 74 The court then noted that the
defendant has the burden of proving that harm is divisible. " This
would avoid the injustice of having a wrongdoer who has caused
harm avoid liability simply because another caused the same harm.
In other words, the fact that the stream was already polluted should
not be a defense, but it should limit the extent to which defendant is
responsible.
The court recognized that under similar circumstances, many
courts, including the Chem-Dyne and Monsanto courts, had found
environmental harm to be indivisible as a matter of law, based on
factors such as differences in toxicity and synergistic properties. 76
The Alcan-Butler court, however, concluded that whether or not
harm is divisible depends greatly on the facts and that Alcan should
have an opportunity to develop the facts and prove divisibility. 7
7
Alcan argued that there was no need for a hearing on divisibility
78because its contribution to the harm was zero. The court rejected
that, but noted that upon remand "if Alcan proves that the emulsion
74. See id. at 269. Section 433 A, Comment d provides that
"[t]here are other kinds of harm which, while not so clearly marked
out as severable into distinct parts, are still capable of division upon
a reasonable and rational basis, and of fair apportionment among the
causes responsible. Such apportionment is commonly made in cases
of private nuisance, where the pollution of a stream has interfered
with the plaintiff's use and enjoyment of his land." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A cmt. d (1965).
75. Alcan-Butler, 964 F.2d at 269. "Under the Restatement,
where a joint tortfeasor seeks to apportion the full amount of a plain-
tiff's damages.... it is the tortfeasor's burden to establish that the
damages are capable of such apportionment. See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(2) (1965).
76. Alcan-Butler, 964 F.2d at 269. "Alcan's burden in attempting
to prove the divisibility of harm to the Susquehanna River is sub-
stantial, and the analysis will be factually complex as it will require
an assessment of the relative toxicity, migratory potential and syner-
gistic capacity of the hazardous waste at issue." See United States v.
Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d at 172 n.26; see also United States v.
Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F.Supp. 802, 811 (1983).
77. Alcan-Butler, 964 F.2d at 269.
78. See id. at 269-270.
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did not or could not . . . contribute to the release and the resultant
response costs, then Alcan should not be responsible for any re-
sponse costs." 79 The court recognized that this result brought causa-
tion back into the analysis, but concluded that such a result is consis-
tent with CERCLA and is the only way to assure that there is some
reason for the imposition of CERCLA liability.
80
The court remanded the case to the trial court to give Alcan an op-
portunity to show that the harm is divisible and that the damages are
capable of reasonable apportionment. This conclusion is inconsis-
tent with the Restatement, which states that liability is apportioned if
the harm is divisible or if there is a reasonable basis for apportion-
ment, but nevertheless, Alcan would have its opportunity to establish
the facts.
While the Alcan-Butler case was working its way through the
Third Circuit, a case with substantially the same facts, but at a dif-
ferent site, was being litigated in New York. In that case, also enti-
tled United States v. Alcan Aluminum, the Second Circuit essentially
adopted the reasoning of the Third Circuit, but with a couple of mi-
nor differences.
82
The Second Circuit began by noting that in order to defeat the
government's motion for summary judgment on the issue of joint and
several liability, Alcan need only show that there are issues of fact
regarding whether there is a reasonable basis for apportionment.
83
79. See id. at 270.
80. Id. at 270-271.
81. Id.
82. United States v. Alcan Aluminum, 990 F.2d 711, 722 (2d Cir.
1993) [hereinafter Alcan] (having assessed CERCLA's plain mean-
ing, its legislative history, and the case-law construing it, the Second
Circuit essentially adopted the reasoning of the Third Circuit in
United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 261-71 (3d
Cir. 1992). This approach will permit a defendant to avoid liability
only when its pollutants contribute no more than background con-
tamination.)
83. See Alcan, 964 F.2d 711. "The polluter bears the ultimate bur-
den of establishing a reasonable basis for apportioning liability."
See also Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 172; and Chem-Dyne, 572 F.Supp. at
810.
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,,84Apportionment, the court stated, is "intensely factual. Once the
question is framed that way, a defendant does not need to do much to
avoid summary judgment and obtain a hearing on the issue of divisi-
bility. This does not mean that divisibility will be the general rule -
it merely makes it unlikely that the issue will be determined on
summary judgment.85
The court recognized that causation was being brought into the
case "through the back door after being denied entry at the front
door." 86 However, the court stated that it was only permitting causa-
tion as defendant's burden and causation could result in a finding of
no liability only where a party shows that background levels are not
exceeded. 87 In other words, the court did not think that examining
causation as a means of proving divisibility was inconsistent with
the fact that causation was not required to prove liability. The court
recognized that its reasoning made it possible to conclude that in the
liability phase, one can be held liable even if they caused no re-
sponse costs, then in the divisibility stage, the same party could be
found to have no liability because it caused no response costs. 88
The court did not address the Restatement's examples of divisibil-
ity, perhaps because none were analogous. In the cases of the cows
and pollution of a stream, each defendant did essentially the same
84. See Alcan, 964 F.2d 711. See also Chem-Dyne, 572 F.Supp.
at 811.
85. See Alcan, 990 F.2d at 722. The commingling of Alcan's
waste emulsion and metallic and organic hazardous substances cre-
ated an issue as to divisibility. The differing contentions by experts
on both sides raised sufficient questions of fact to preclude the grant-
ing of summary judgment on the divisibility issue. On remand, the
factual question should be - is there a reasonable basis for appor-
tionment, not is there a precise basis. Otherwise, the phrase "reason-
able basis" would be written out of the restatement. Id.
86. Id. The Court explained that causation was brought back into
the case at the backdoor, at the apportionment stage, after being de-
nied entry at the front door, where liability is ascertained.
87. Id. The Court then added that placing the burden of proving
causation on the defendant was reintroduced as a "special excep-
tion," only to allow the defendant to escape payment where its pol-
lutants did not contribute more than background levels, as in Alcan-
Butler
88. See id. at 723.
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thing and the effects were cumulative. Alcan's claim, on the other
hand, was that it did something significantly different. Alcan was
not arguing that it had fewer cows and should pay less. Alcan was
arguing that the field was trampled by cows and it didn't have a cow.
It had something which was totally harmless and which already ex-
isted at the site.89 While the Restatement example of the cows could
present a means to limit the extent of a defendant's liability, Alcan
did not rely in that example because Alcan sought to avoid liability
in its entirety, not to merely limit its liability.
In United States v. Township of Brighton, the Sixth Circuit carried
this discussion of causation further, again allowing a fact hearing on
the issue of divisibility.90 Brighton Township operated a dump on
part of a site that became an inactive hazardous waste site. Brighton
Township operated the site for only part of the period in which dis-
posal occurred at the site. Brighton Township's argument against
liability was that the hazardous substances at the site were deposited
after Brighton left the site in 1973, or in a manner outside the control
of Brighton Township. 9' The trial court found the Township to have
joint and several liability as an operator of the facility. 92
89. See id. at 722. Contrary to the Government's position, com-
mingling is not synonymous with indivisible harm. The response
costs were attributed to substances such as PCB's, nitro benzene,
phenol, dichlonoethone, toluene, and benzene. Alcan contends "that
no soil contamination due to heavy metals was found there and in-
sist[ed] that the metallic constituents of its oil emulsion are insoluble
compounds," were therefore capable of reasonable apportionment.
Id.
90. See United States v. Township of Brighton, 153 F.3d 307,
318-19 [hereinafter Brighton] (6th Cir. 1998).
91. See Brighton, 153 F.3d at 317. Claiming that the evidence
showed that hazardous materials found at the site were "either placed
there after 1973, or placed there by non-residents, beyond the scope
of Brighton Township's operator status." Id.
92. See id. at 316-317. The Court vacated the district court's rul-
ing that Brighton Township was an operator of the facility, while
stating that there was enough evidence that hazardous materials were
brought onto the site before 1973 to support the district court's find-
ing of liability under § 9607. "If an entity is an operator, it is jointly
and severally liable for any hazardous material that is found, what-
ever its source, unless that operator can show divisibility." It is inter-
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The appeals court began its discussion of divisibility by pointing
out that courts have generally imposed joint and several liability in
CERCLA cases and that exceptions to that rule have been developed
based on § 433A of the Restatement. 93 Section 433A would not im-
pose joint and several liability where there is "a reasonable basis for
determining the contribution of each cause." 94 The issue upon which
there is no consensus, the court noted, is what constitutes "a reason-
able basis."
95
The court contrasted what it saw as two distinct views on divisibil-
ity: (1) a fairness type approach and (2) a causation analysis. 96 The
fairness approach would look to equitable factors in an attempt to
determine responsibility.97 The causation analysis is essentially that
proposed by the Bell and Alcan-Butler courts.9 8 The court preferred
the causation analysis, reasoning that causation analysis is more in
line with the Restatement and Congress' intent to incorporate the
Restatement into CERCLA.99
The court acknowledged that this analysis weakens the strict liabil-
ity aspect of CERCLA because it is possible that a defendant will be
found responsible under CERCLA and be found to have zero liabil-
esting to note that after the Sixth Circuit vacated the trial court's de-
cision, the trial court again found the harm not to be divisible and the
Sixth Circuit again vacated that decision. See United States v.
Township of Brighton, 282 F.3d 915 (6 th Cir. 2002).
93. See Brighton, 153 F.3d at 318. "The Restatement says that
'damages for harm are to be apportioned among two or more causes
where (a) there are distinct harms, or (b) there is a reasonable basis
for determining the contribution of each cause to a single harm."' Id.
94. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1965).
95. See Brighton, 153 F.3d at 318. "Although most courts have
looked to the Restatement to at least some degree, there is no con-
sensus as to what constitutes a 'reasonable basis."' Id.
96. See id. at 319. The Brighton Court distinguished "the divisi-
bility defense to joint and several liability from the equitable alloca-
tion principles.., under CERCLA's contribution provision," stating
that former is legal, while the latter is equitable. As such, "the re-
spective tests should reflect that distinction." Id.
97. See id.
98. See supra notes 45-47 and 70-72 and accompanying text.
99. See Brighton, 153 F.3d at 319.
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ity based on causation.100 This anomaly, the court stated, is built
into the Restatement.'
0
'
The court then made some concluding statements about divisibility
which are potentially inconsistent. The court said that divisibility is
a factual issue, and an appellate court will therefore use "clear error"
as its standard of review.1°2 This would imply that "if they are in
doubt, they should impose joint and several liability." Then the
court noted that divisibility will be permitted where there is a rea-
sonable basis for apportionment based on causation. 10 3 The decision
is unclear regarding what doubt is to be resolved in favor of joint and
several liability. The doubt at issue cannot be doubt regarding ap-
portionment because reasonable basis implies uncertainty.
The problem stems in part from the court not being clear regarding
when it is addressing the trial court and when it is addressing the
appellate court. The statement regarding the clear error standard of
review describes the appellate court review of a court decision on a
question of fact. 1°4 The appeal from a summary judgment, where
there had been no factual hearing, would be treated differently, be-
cause the court would be reviewing a decision of law, not a decision
of fact. 105 The statement regarding resolving doubt in favor of joint
and several liability would therefore be after a hearing on the facts.
The clear error standard would require the appellate court to err on
the side of not applying joint and several liability if the trial court
had not found that there was a reasonable basis for apportionment,
then held a fact hearing to determine how to apportion.'06
The court's statement regarding divisibility if there is a reasonable
basis for apportionment based on causation is addressing the legal
issue and could be addressing either the trial or appellate court.
Thus, the court's position was like the Restatement's, that a reason-
100. Id. at 318. "This is because defendants who can show that the
harm is divisible, and they are not responsible for any of the harm....
have effectively fixed their own share of the damages at zero."
Brighton, 153 F.3d at 318.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 319. Also note, that the Sequa court disagreed and saw
divisibility as a legal issue.
103. Id.
104. Brighton, 153 F.3d at 319.
105. See id.
106. See id.
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able basis for apportionment is reason to hold a hearing, but if there
is a finding of fact after a hearing, the appellate court should only
overturn that decision if there is clear error.
The court could not have meant that doubt regarding reasonable
basis for apportioning is to be resolved in favor of joint and several
liability because that would effectively eliminate the reasonable ba-
sis standard. There are many things about which we are in doubt,
but have a reasonable basis for deciding and there is nothing in the
court's decision that indicates that divisibility is to be permitted only
if there is certainty. The standard is then essentially the same as in
In re Bell - if there is a reasonable basis for dividing, then have a
hearing and if the trier of fact finds that it is more likely than not that
a person caused only a particular portion of the harm, they are re-
sponsible only for that portion. 08
In a concurring opinion, Judge Moore analyzed the use of causa-
tion in divisibility.1°9 He began by noting that language requiring a
causal connection between the generator of the waste and the release
causing the response costs was removed from the bill that became
CERCLA." 0 Courts have viewed that as a rejection of a causation
requirement, even though a similar removal of joint and several li-
ability language has not been seen as a rejection of joint and several
liability. This leads to an apparent anomaly: a plaintiff does not have
to prove causation to establish liability, but a defendant can avoid
liability by proving lack of causation."
Judge Moore correctly noted that what made this case unique was
the fact that the defendant was an operator, while prior discussions
107. See id.
108. Seeid.
109. See id. at 322.
110. Id. at 328. "The legislative history supports the absence of a
causation requirement, as the final version of the bill ultimately
passed by Congress deleted the requirement that liability be imposed
only on those who 'caused or contributed to the release or threatened
release' contained in the earlier version passed by the House of Rep-
resentatives." H.R. 7020, 96th Cong. 3071(a)(1)(D), 126 CONG.
REC. 26,779 (1980). This deleted language required a causal nexus
between a generator and the release causing the incurrence of re-
sponse costs.
111. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
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of divisibility had all involved generators." 2 He viewed the divisi-
bility defense to joint and several liability as a means of "tempering
the harshness of unlimited liability" for someone who did not cause
the contamination, or who caused only a small part of it." 3 How-
ever, because owners and operators did not directly cause the con-
tamination, there is a greater concern that issues of equity and culpa-
bility will creep into the analysis with owners and operators. To
prevent this, Judge Moore would limit the divisibility defense for
such parties to temporal division' 14 (i.e. where defendant operated a
facility for only a portion of the time that waste was disposed of at
the facility).
WHAT IS DIVISIBLE?
Section 433A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts is entitled
"Apportionment of Harm to Causes," clearly indicating that the in-
tent is to apportion harm among "causes." 1 5 The key is not how
112. See Brighton, 153 F.3d at 329-30. Judge Moore opined that
"the courts should allow an operator to show divisibility of harm,"
despite the fact that such a defense has been used primarily in con-
junction with generators of hazardous waste.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 330-31. "[A]pportionment is appropriate only where the
previous owner or operator presents sufficient evidence from which
the court can determine the portion of harm caused by the hazardous
substances disposed of at the time of its ownership or operation of
the facility, as distinguished from the portion of harm caused by haz-
ardous waste amassed on the property at a time when the defendant
was not the owner or operator of the facility." See also In re Bell
Petroleum Services, 3 F.3d 902-904 (holding that there was a rea-
sonable basis for apportioning liability among former owners where
only a portion of harm was caused by hazardous waste disposed of at
the time the defendant owned the facility."
115. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (SECOND) TORTS § 433A
(1965).
"§ 433A Apportionment of Harm to Causes:
(1) Damages for harm are to be apportioned among two or
more causes where:
(a) there are distinct harms, or
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many harms there are or whether the harm is indivisible. The key
issue is whether one can attribute parts of the harm or harms to iden-
tifiable causes. Certainly, where there are separate harms or where
one harm breaks into identifiable parts it is easier to apportion, but
the Restatement makes clear that those are not the only cases in
which apportionment is appropriate.
The Restatement uses the cows and the field to illustrate this point.
Comment d states that where "cattle of two or more owners trespass
upon the plaintiff's land and destroy his crop, the aggregate harm is
a lost crop, but it may nevertheless be apportioned among the owners
of the cattle on the basis of the number owned by each, and the rea-
sonable assumption that the respective harm done is proportionate to
that number." 16 There is only one lost crop. It does not divide into
recognizable parts. Nevertheless, the causes are separable and the
Restatement would apportion the damages rather than imposing joint
and several liability on the defendants.' 7
A second important lesson we learn from the cows illustration is
that apportionment is an estimate based on reasonable assump-
tions '1 8 - there is no requirement of precise division. The Restate-
ment does not say that the cows of the various owners need to be of
similar age because we may assume that younger cows are more
rambunctious. No questions are raised regarding whether anyone's
cows showed prior crop destroying propensities. The question of
whether the crop damage is greater near one of the borders is not
asked. A creative attorney representing the owner of the most cows
(b) there is a reasonable basis for determining the con-
tribution of each cause to a single harm.
(2) Damages for any other harm cannot be apportioned
among two or more causes.
116. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 433A cmt. d (1965). "Thus
where two or more factories independently pollute a stream, the in-
terference with the plaintiffs use of the water may be treated as di-
visible in terms of degree, and may be apportioned among the own-
ers of the factories, on the basis of evidence of the respective quanti-
ties of pollution discharged into the stream."
117. See id.
118. See id. "There are other kinds of harm which, while not so
clearly marked out as severable into distinct parts, are still capable of
division upon a reasonable and rational basis, and of fair apportion-
ment among the causes responsible."
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could make numerous reasonable arguments why the number of
cows may not be a fair basis for apportionment. All of those ques-
tions go to the question of accurate apportionment, not to reasonable
apportionment.
Does that mean that the Restatement favors reasonable apportion-
ment over accurate apportionment? Clearly not. The question is not
whether those facts are relevant, but when they are relevant. When
the issue is the question of law regarding whether to require joint and
several liability or to apportion damages, the Restatement says to
look whether there is a reasonable means of apportionment. If there
is, then a hearing is held and each of these facts becomes relevant.
At the hearing, the issue is how to apportion damages, and if the de-
fendant's reasonable theory of apportionment is supported by the
preponderance of the evidence, then damages are apportioned ac-
cordingly. If not, whatever method has the preponderance is used.
Some might suggest that comment (i) to § 433A is inconsistent
with the above analysis. Comment (i) states that "[c]ertain kinds of
harm, by their very nature, are incapable of any logical, reasonable
or practical division."'"19 This comment would appear to suggest that
to determine whether to divide, we look to the nature of the harm
and not the nature of the causes. Death, comment i states, is ordinar-
ily incapable of division.' 2
0
The Restatement's illustrations in comment i, however, are all il-
lustrations in which the nature of the causes is significantly different
from the nature of the causes in the illustrations of divisibility. In
illustration 12, for example, two negligent drivers collide and a by-
stander is injured as a result of the collision. 12 1 In illustration 14,
two parties negligently discharge oil, which is ignited by a spark
causing a fire that bums down plaintiff's bam.
22
In their hombook on torts, Professors Prosser and Keeton note that
the cases in which divisibility is appropriate are those in which nei-
ther cause is necessary to the creation of the harm and neither cause
119. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 433A cmt. i (1965).
120. Id.
121. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS, § 433A cmt. i, illus. 12
(1965).
122. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS, § 433A cmt. i, illus. 14
(1965).
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is sufficient to create the harm.' 23 The joint pollution and cow illus-
trations fit into this category. Remove one party's cows and there is
likely to be less damage to the field because no one party is alleged
to have caused all the damages. In such cases, the harm may be di-
visible. However, where either cause would be sufficient to cause
the entire harm or where both are necessary to create the harm, it is
not unfair to impose joint and several liability.
Prosser and Keeton understand illustration 12 as a case in which
neither cause was sufficient to cause the harm, but both were neces-
sary. In such cases, because no injury would have occurred without
the combined wrongful acts, it is appropriate to impose joint and
several liability. Similarly, in illustration 14, neither was necessary
and either was sufficient to cause the injury. Where the negligent act
of either party would have been sufficient to cause the entire harm,
joint and several liability is not unfair.
The divisible harms illustrations are all cases in which the harm is
cumulative. The second person merely adds to the harm caused by
the first. More cows means more of the same harm, not a different
harm from what the other caused. In such cases, no one should be
responsible for the whole because his act was neither sufficient for
the development of the whole nor necessary for the resulting harm.
These illustrations help explain why timing can be an important
factor. In illustration 12, the collision between two negligent drivers
results in injury to a bystander (A + B = injury to C). Both are nec-
essary for the injury and liability is joint and several. If they did not
interact, however, assume that A negligently hits C's car and B sub-
sequently does the same, liability would not be joint and several. B
cannot be responsible for all the damages. He hit an already dam-
aged car. A cannot be responsible for all the damage. His negli-
gence did not in any way contribute to the damages subsequently
caused by B.
Based on the above, the conclusion of the Chem-Dyne and Mon-
santo courts may have been correct. Defendants argued that, like the
cows, the injury they caused was merely cumulative. Each could
argue that their waste was not necessary (remove any one party and
you still have a big mess) and that their waste was not sufficient (the
addition of other wastes made the environmental harm greater and
perhaps different).
123. PROSSER, WILLIAM L. & W. PAGE KEETON, THE LAW OF
TORTS § 52 (5' hed. 1984).
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The courts, on the other hand, reasoned that illustration 12 is more
closely analogous. The synergistic effect of the combination of
chemicals created a different problem for which each party's waste
was necessary. In the alternative, based on differences in toxicity, it
may be that any one party's waste could have been sufficient to re-
quire a costly remedy. Depending on the specific facts, either of
those reasons could justify the use of joint and several liability.
Applying this rule to the recent environmental case law, it would
seem that the In re Bell decision was sound because each party did
essentially the same thing at a different time. The effect was cumu-
lative. No one party's action was sufficient to cause the injury (illus-
tration 12) and no one party's action was necessary for there to be an
injury. Therefore, no one party should be responsible for the whole.
Alcan is a bit more complicated. Alcan's argument that appor-
tionment was appropriate was based on Alcan's assertion that its
emulsion caused none of the clean-up costs. Based on the above
rule, the question is not limited to what one person caused. The
question should be, did its combination with other materials at the
site cause response costs that might not have been caused if both
were not present? If it did, then a good case could be made that its
combination was not merely cumulative. It may have been neces-
sary for the formation of certain costs, but not sufficient, making it
more like the illustration of the car accident (illustration 12) than the
cows. Interestingly, on remand, the trial court noted that the emul-
sion had caused the other contaminants to migrate further than they
otherwise would have. Thus, the emulsion combined with the other
contaminants so that both were necessary. Thus, Alcan could be
jointly and severally liable.
In Brighton, the Court divided liability based on time, assuming
that one could not be responsible for harm that occurred while they
were not present or in any way responsible for activities at the site.
That would probably be true if the harm at the site was merely cu-
mulative. The court does not appear to have asked that question. It
is conceivable that pollution at different times could react together in
a manner that creates joint and several liability for an operator whose
relationship to the site is limited in terms of time. Indeed, it is diffi-
cult to see why an operator who accepted waste during only part of
the time that the site accepted waste has a better shot at divisibility
than a generator who only sent one shipment of waste.
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How THE REMEDY AFFECTS DIVISIBILITY
The above analysis implies that the selected remedy can have a
major impact on whether the harm is apportioned. If the emphasis is
on how (or whether) the multiple causes interact to create the harm,
defining the harm becomes very important. For example, assume a
site that has contamination from both volatile organic compounds
("VOCs") and metals. A Chem-Dyne analysis might look at the
mixture as the harm, and say that because of the possible differences
in toxicity and the difficulty in determining how they might interact,
they should be treated as one harm, not separate harms. If removal
of contaminated soil is the remedy, it may be difficult to determine
the extent to which each contributed to the remedy, and indeed both
contaminants may have been sufficient to require this remedy.
On the other hand, if the selected remedy is, or includes, treating
groundwater for VOCs or soil vapor extraction, a good case could be
made that the persons responsible for the metals should not be re-
quired to pay for that element of the remedy. They did not contrib-
ute to the harm (i.e. the need for this remedy). Their delivery of
waste to the site was neither necessary to the existence of that harm
nor sufficient to cause it.
A capping remedy presents another interesting twist. Assume that
a wide variety of contaminants are mixed together and the selected
remedy is capping. In that case, defendants have a good argument
that the wastes are cumulative like the cows, and therefore, appor-
tionment is appropriate. No one party's waste was necessary to the
harm. Additionally, it is likely that no one party's waste would be
sufficient to cause the harm. The argument could be made that
without information regarding relative toxicity and interactive na-
ture, there is no reasonable basis for apportioning. However, toxic-
ity and interactive nature are relevant only if the remedy takes toxic-
ity or interactive nature into account. That is, the relative toxicity
and interactive nature are relevant only if they have an impact on the
harm, an impact on determining what technology to use, what
cleanup standard to use, how much soil needs to be removed, etc.
However, when a cap is chosen, a decision has been made that none
of that really matters. The quantity is so great or so diverse that
treatment or removal is not feasible. In such a case, each party's
waste is merely cumulative. It is as if each party contributed the
same material and apportionment based on quantity should be ap-
propriate.
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DOES A RULE FOCUSED ON CAUSATION UNDERMINE STRICT
LIABILITY?
A number of courts have suggested that a rule of divisibility based
on causation is problematic because it: (1) makes the extent of li-
ability depend on a factor that is not required to prove liability, and
(2) it undermines the strict liability aspect of Superfund. This sec-
tion will address these concerns.
The Restatement would not have any problem apportioning based
on a factor that is not a source of liability. Comment e to § 433A
provides that "the same kind of apportionment" (i.e. apportionment
based on causes of harm) "can fairly be assigned to an innocent
cause." 124 For example, the Restatement provides that where defen-
dant's dam combines with unprecedented rainfall to create property
damage, defendant should be responsible only for the harm that
would have resulted from the dam and not the harm that was added
by the rainfall. 125 If causation can be a means of apportionment ap-
plicable to innocent causes, causes that cannot be a source of liabil-
ity, causation can certainly be a means applicable to non-innocent
causes that are not a source of liability, (e.g. Superfund defendants).
As the drafters of the Restatement would see it, it is too simplistic
to say that causation is either relevant or not relevant. Causation is
not relevant to determining who is liable. However, in determining
how to divide that liability among the liable parties, causation is a
critical factor. Liability and apportionment are different analyses
based on different factors.
Additionally, there is no inconsistency between a causation re-
quirement and strict liability. Strict products liability requires that
the defective product cause the injury. Strict liability for abnormally
dangerous activities also requires a causal relationship between the
danger and the injury. Indeed CERCLA is unique in not requiring a
defendant's hazardous substances to cause the response costs. Thus,
it is inaccurate to suggest that apportionment based on causation is
inconsistent with strict liability.
A rule of apportionment based on causation is also not inconsistent
with the Superfund Law. All courts agree that the Superfund Law
does not require joint and several liability. There is also unanimity
regarding the fact that Restatement § 433A is the basis for the fed-
124. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS, § 433A cmt. e (1965).
125. Id.
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eral common law regarding when joint and several liability is re-
quired. There are differences of opinion regarding when to apply §
433A, but § 433A divides among causes of harm. 26 If § 433A is
built into the Superfund law and § 433A divides based on causes of
harm, then dividing based on causes of harm cannot be inconsistent
with the Superfund law.
A second argument suggesting that use of causation is inconsistent
with Superfund is based on § 107(b)(3) of CERCLA. Section 107(b)
provides for the only defenses to Superfund liability.127 A responsi-
ble party will not be liable if the release was caused solely by: (1) an
act of God; (2) an act of war; or (3) a third party.' 28 The third party
defense, however, is conditioned upon the defendant exercising due
care with regard to hazardous substances and taking precautions
against the foreseeable acts of third parties. 1
29
Those conditions on the third party defense clearly contemplate
that the release could be solely caused by a third party, yet the de-
fense would be unavailable because the person seeking the defense
did not take precautions against the acts of third parties. In such a
case, a person who did not cause the release (because the release was
caused solely by a third party) would not have a defense. However,
apportionment based on cause of the harm could result in a finding
of zero liability. Zero liability, when there is no defense, is seen as
inconsistent with the regulatory scheme because it appears to create
a defense that is not in the statute.
The Alcan courts did not see this as an inconsistency. They recog-
nized that causation was being used in two different ways: (1) causa-
tion is not a defense and a defendant who did not cause any of the
response costs may be liable for those costs; (2) causation as a means
to apportion among liable parties may result in a finding of zero li-
ability. 130 The cases in which there is zero liability will be quite
rare, but more importantly, if the court's understanding of § 433A is
correct, and a § 433A type analysis is built into CERCLA, then the
result is correct even if the result appears to be inconsistent with an-
other portion of CERCLA.
126. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 433A (1965).
127. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b).
128. Id.
129. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3).
130. See Alcan, 964 F.2d at 271.
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The Alcan court has been accused of manipulating the rules re-
garding summary judgment in order to avoid a conclusion it consid-
ered unfair. The basis for that accusation is that prior courts on simi-
lar facts (i.e. commingled waste) had generally granted summary
judgement for the government. Courts have also indicated that de-
fendant's burden of proof to defeat that summary judgment motion
was substantial. The Alcan court, on the other hand, seemed to indi-
cate that because of the "intensely factual" nature of inquiry regard-
ing apportionment, summary judgment should not be so difficult to
defeat.
The Alcan court's conclusion regarding summary judgement
should be seen as a statement about apportionment, not a statement
about summary judgement. If § 433A provides for apportionment
based on causes of the harm whenever there is a reasonable basis for
apportionment, then summary judgement on that issue should be
rare. It should be rare not because it is so easy to show that there is a
reasonable basis for apportionment, but because it should not be dif-
ficult to provide some facts which support the finding of a reason-
able basis of apportionment.
The ease in defeating summary judgement does not imply that
joint and several liability will be rare. There will be many cases in
which there is some factual evidence of a reasonable basis for appor-
tionment, but after a hearing, defendant will have failed to prove that
it is more likely than not that apportionment is appropriate. Indeed,
Alcan may be such a case. The evidence that Alcan's waste emul-
sion was clean and could not have caused any response costs pro-
vided evidence of a reasonable basis for apportionment. After a
hearing, however, the emulsion was found to have increased the re-
sponse costs by assisting the spread of the contaminants that were
being remediated.
The In re Bell court arrived at essentially the same conclusion re-
garding § 433A. In order to defeat summary judgement a defendant
does not need precise volumetric division. It merely needs to pro-
duce a reasonable theory of apportionment and a factual basis for
that theory. A defendant does not need to show that it is more likely
than not the correct theory in order to defeat summary judgement.
The more likely than not standard is the standard to be applied by
triers of fact after a hearing.
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CONCLUSION
Recent case law and the Restatement combine to present a differ-
ent picture of apportionment than typically considered by Superfund
practitioners. At common law, as described by the Restatement, an
indivisible harm would be apportioned among causes when neither
cause was necessary or sufficient to create the injury. The cows il-
lustrate this point. By examining the relationship between the causes
of the harms, it becomes clear that there are many situations where
the PRPs are, like the cows, merely cumulative. The typical Super-
fund case is probably unaffected because where the hazardous sub-
stances react with each other, each may become necessary to creat-
ing the harm. On the other hand, the harm should be defined as the
response costs and not necessarily the mess. Thus, to determine
whether the impact of the PRPs is cumulative or not, one often needs
a technical understanding of the site and the proposed remedy.
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